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Abstract 
Introduction: Aberrant experience of agency is characteristic of schizophrenia. An 
understanding of the neurobiological basis of such experience is therefore of considerable 
importance for developing successful models of the disease. We aimed to characterise the 
effects of ketamine, a drug model for psychosis, on sense of agency (SoA). SoA is associated 
with a subjective compression of the temporal interval between an action and its effects: this 
is known as “intentional binding”. This action-effect binding provides an indirect measure of 
SoA.  Previous research has found that the magnitude of binding is exaggerated in patients 
with schizophrenia. We therefore investigated whether ketamine administration to otherwise 
healthy adults induced a similar pattern of binding. Methods: 14 right-handed healthy 
participants (8 female; mean age 22.4 years) were given low-dose ketamine (100 ng/mL 
plasma) and completed the binding task. They also underwent structured clinical interviews. 
Results: Ketamine mimicked the performance of schizophrenia patients on the intentional 
binding task, significantly increasing binding relative to placebo.  The size of this effect also 
correlated with aberrant bodily experiences engendered by the drug. Conclusions: These data 
suggest that ketamine may be able to mimic certain aberrant agency experiences that 
characterise schizophrenia. The link to individual changes in bodily experience suggests that 
the fundamental change produced by the drug has wider consequences in terms of 
individuals’ experiences of their bodies and movements. 
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Introduction 
Administration of the anaesthetic agent, ketamine, to healthy participants produces a state 
that resembles schizophrenia (Ghoneim, Hinrichs, Mewaldt, & Petersen, 1985; Krystal et al., 
1994;Lahti, Weiler, Tamara Michaelidis, Parwani, & Tamminga, 2001). Although there are 
notable differences between the ketamine state and established schizophrenic illness (for 
example, ketamine does not reliably produce auditory hallucinations; Fletcher & Honey, 
2006), ketamine does produce a range of symptoms associated with endogenous psychosis, 
including perceptual changes, ideas of reference, thought disorder and some negative 
symptoms (Ghoneim et al., 1985; Krystal et al., 1994; Lahti et al., 2001; Pomarol-Clotet et 
al., 2006; Morgan, Mofeez, Brandner, Bromley, & Curran, 2004; Mason, Morgan, 
Stefanovic, & Curran, 2008). In addition, a number of cognitive changes produced by 
ketamine are comparable to those seen in schizophrenia   (e.g. learning: Corlett et al., 2007; 
memory: Fletcher & Honey, 2006; attention: Oranje et al., 2000; language: Covington et al., 
2007).  Overall, the effects of ketamine are most strikingly characteristic of the earliest stages 
of psychosis (Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007).  Moreover, ketamine causes changes in 
brain activity that overlap with those reported in schizophrenia (Vollenweider et al., 1997; 
Vollenweider, Leenders, Oye, Hell, & Angst, 1997; Breier, Malhotra, Pinals, Weisenfeld, & 
Pickar, 1997; Corlett et al., 2006). An important next step is to explore the effects of 
ketamine in greater detail and to exploit the potential that this approach offers for relating 
cognitive-behavioural function to subjective experiences in psychosis.  
 
Schizophrenia is associated with important changes in the experience of voluntary action 
such as those that occur in delusions of control (Frith, 1992). Although it has received little 
formal documentation, ketamine also, in our experience, alters the way that participants 
experience their own actions. For example, participants sometimes report that they don’t feel 
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fully in control of their own actions (“I don’t feel in control of my muscles…”, and “…as 
though someone else was controlling my movements”;Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2006). Given 
these observations, together with the perceptuomotor abnormalities in schizophrenia, the 
current study was set up to characterise the effects of ketamine on a task examining voluntary 
actions and their sensory consequences. 
 
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of initiating and controlling voluntary action 
to achieve effects in the outside world. Sense of agency is a background feeling that 
accompanies most of our actions.  Perhaps because of its ubiquity, it has proved difficult to 
isolate and measure experimentally.  Recently, action-related changes in time perception have 
been proposed as a proxy for SoA (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Haggard, 
2008; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009).  
 
Situations that elicit SoA are associated with systematic changes in the temporal experience 
of actions and outcomes: there is a subjective compression of the interval between the action 
and the outcome. This relation between SoA and subjective time is revealed in the intentional 
binding paradigm developed by Haggard et al (2002). In an agency condition, in which 
participants’ actions produced outcome tones, participants judged the time of an action or the 
time of the subsequent tone, in separate blocks of trials. Actions were perceived as occurring 
later in time compared to a non-agency (baseline) condition in which participants’ actions did 
not produce tones.  In addition, a tone that followed the action was perceived as occurring 
earlier in time compared to a non-agency (baseline) condition involving tones but no actions. 
Importantly, these shifts were only found for voluntary actions: when the outcome was 
caused by an involuntary movement the reverse pattern of results was observed (actions 
perceived earlier and outcomes perceived later than their respective baseline estimates).  
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Increased SoA is therefore associated with a later awareness of the action, and an earlier 
awareness of the outcome. This effect is robust and has been consistently replicated (see, for 
example, Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert, Wohlschläger, 
& Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). It has also been shown that these 
changes in the subjective experience of time correlate with explicit higher-order changes in 
the sense of agency, as measured using subjective rating scales (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; 
Moore & Haggard, 2010). In this way, intentional binding offers a precise, implicit measure 
of SoA.   
 
Of primary interest to the present study is the fact that the binding effect, defined as the 
temperal attraction between voluntary action and outcome, is greater in people with 
schizophrenia (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003; Voss et al., 
2010). That is, people with schizophrenia show increased intentional binding. Our principal 
aim here was to determine whether ketamine also induced increased binding, as previously 
reported in schizophrenia.  
 
We also investigated the relationship between this implicit measure of SoA and subjective 
experiences of dissociation and psychotic-like phenomena produced by the drug as measured 
using the Clinician-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS; Bremner et al., 1998). 
Here we focussed our analysis on changes in the subjective experience of one’s own body, 
since sense of ownership (SoO) over one’s body and SoA may be related. For example, in 
healthy individuals SoA for a voluntary action may strongly depend on a SoO (Gallagher, 
2000; Gallagher, 2007; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007).  The reverse 
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relationship may also hold, whereby the neurocognitive processes that give rise to sense of 
agency also contribute to SoO (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006).  
 
Dissociative symptoms, such as depersonalisation, are a common effect of the ketamine 
challenge (Goff & Coyle, 2001). Furthermore, there is frequent co-occurrence of 
depersonalisation and abnormal bodily experience (Sierra, Baker, Medford, & David, 2005; 
Simeon et al., 2008). Although not typically associated with established schizophrenic illness, 
depersonalisation appears to be associated with the schizophrenia prodrome (Krystal et al., 
1994; Goff & Coyle, 2001). Therefore, given the link between bodily experience and sense of 
agency, and the common disruption of bodily experience engendered by the ketamine 
challenge, the body perception subscale on the CADSS questionnaire was of primary interest.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
18 right-handed healthy volunteers were recruited (8 female; mean age 22.4 (19-26; mean 
NART IQ (114 (+/-7))). The study was approved by Addenbrookes NHS Trust Research 
Ethics Committee. Participants provided written, informed consent. 
 
One participant was excluded from the analysis on the basis of a pre-existing history of 
psychiatric illness (although all participants were screened for the presence of psychiatric 
illness in themselves and relatives prior to taking part in the study, this participant only 
disclosed this information after testing). Three participants failed to complete the intentional 
binding task owing to nausea produced by the drug infusion. Therefore, 14 participants were 
included in the final analysis. 
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These same participants also completed other cognitive tasks, unrelated to SoA, during 
infusion.  It is planned to publish those results elsewhere.   
 
Experimental design 
The study used a double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomised, within-subjects design.  
 
Infusion protocol 
Participants were administered placebo (saline) or racemic ketamine (2 mg/mL) as an 
intravenous infusion using a target-controlled infusion system comprising a computer which 
implemented Stanpump software (S Shafer; http://www.opentci.org/doku.php?id=code:code) 
to control a syringe driver infusion pump (Graseby 3500; Graseby Medical Ltd, Watford, 
United Kingdom). Stanpump was programmed to use a 2-compartmental pharmacokinetic 
model (Rigby-Jones, Sneyd & Absalom, poster presentation), to implement a complex 
infusion profile designed to achieve pre-specified plasma ketamine concentrations. 
  
 
During the drug session, participants received first low-dose ketamine (plasma target 
100ng/mL) and then higher dose (plasma target 200ng/mL). The intentional binding task was 
completed at the low dose. Drug and placebo sessions were separated by at least one week. 
Participants also underwent a clinical rating (see below). The order of drug and placebo visits 
was counterbalanced across all 18 participants initially recruited. Of the 14 participants who 
were included in the final analysis, 8 participants completed the ketamine session first.   
 
 Intentional binding (see Figure 1) 
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Participants watched a computer screen on which a hand rotated around a clock-face (marked 
at conventional “5-minute” intervals). Each full rotation lasted 2560ms. In the agency 
condition, participants pressed a key with their right index finger at a time of their choosing. 
This key press produced a tone after a delay of 250ms. The clock-hand continued rotating for 
a random period of time (between 1500ms and 2500ms). This ensures that the finishing 
position of the clock-hand is not informative with respect to where it was when the action or 
tone occurred (see Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). When the hand stopped rotating 
participants verbally reported the time of their key press or the subsequent tone. These 
judgements were blocked, so participants only made a single type of estimate on each trial in 
each block. To make the time estimates, participants reported the position of the hand on the 
clock face when they either pressed the key or heard the tone. Participants completed a block 
of 20 action estimate trials and a block of 20 tone estimate trials. 
 
They completed two further 20 trial baseline blocks of time estimates. In one block (baseline 
action) participants pressed the key at a time of their choosing. However, the key press never 
produced a tone, and on each trial participants reported the time of the key press. In the other 
block (baseline effect) participants made no key presses. Instead, a tone would sound at a 
random time on each trial and participants reported the time of the tone. The order of agency 
and baseline blocks was randomised anew for each participant. All blocks (baseline and 
agency) were performed during the drug/ saline infusion.   
 
For our analysis we calculated an overall measure of intentional binding. We first calculated 
the binding effect for actions and tones individually. Action binding is found by subtracting 
the mean time estimate in the baseline action condition from the mean time estimate of 
actions in the agency condition. Tone binding is found by subtracting the mean time estimate 
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in the baseline tone condition from the mean time estimate of tones in the agency condition.  
The overall measure of intentional binding was calculated by combining action and tone 
binding (i.e. action binding minus tone binding). To determine the effect of ketamine on 
intentional binding (and therefore SoA), this overall measure of intentional binding was 
compared within subjects (ketamine vs. placebo; paired-samples t-test).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Clinical assessment 
The Clinician-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS; Bremner et al., 1998)
 
was 
administered at both 100ng/mL and 200ng/mL.There are five subscales, each of which 
consists of items (questions), and participants’ responses are coded on a 5-point scale (0: 
“Not at all” through to 4: “Extremely”). As discussed, our analysis focussed primarily on the 
body perception category. We assessed the strength of correlation between scores on items 
relating to body perception at 100ng/mL with binding on ketamine.  
 
Results 
During the intentional binding task the target plasma ketamine concentration was 100 ng/mL, 
and the mean ± SD measured ketamine plasma concentration was 157 ± 36 ng/mL.  
 
Ketamine effects on intentional binding 
Table 1 presents the binding effects for key presses and tones (mean shifts from baseline) for 
the 14 participants who completed the task. These data show that in the agency conditions on 
both placebo and ketamine, key presses were bound towards tones and tones were bound 
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back towards key presses. This is consistent with the intentional binding effect, as previously 
reported (e.g. Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Engbert et al., 2008). 
  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 (final column) also presents the overall binding measure (key press binding minus 
tone binding). These data show that overall binding was greater under ketamine compared 
with placebo. A paired-samples t-test revealed that this difference was significant, t (13) = 
2.79, p = .008 (1-tailed). Follow-up paired sample t-tests suggest that this difference is due to 
differences in binding for actions towards tones, t (13), = 2.35, p = .036 (2-tailed) rather than 
differences in binding for tones towards actions, t (13) = .242, p = .812 (2-tailed). 
Furthermore, this exaggerated binding appears to be driven by changes in baseline action 
judgements; isolated actions on ketamine were perceived as occurring significantly earlier 
than on placebo, t (13) = 2.59, p = .023  (2-tailed). Intentional binding is an implicit measure 
of SoA. These findings therefore suggest that SoA is exaggerated under ketamine, which is 
consistent with previous data on patients with schizophrenia (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et 
al., 2010).  
 
The relation between binding and body perception 
We also examined the strength of correlation between binding on ketamine and scores on the 
CADSS assessment. The overall main effect of ketamine was generated by changes in action 
binding. Therefore, our correlations were based on this binding measure. There was no 
significant correlation between action binding and the overall CADSS score (r = .197, p = 
499; 2-tailed). Further analyses focussed on the body perception subscale. There was a 
significant positive correlation between action binding and item 6 on the CADSS which asks, 
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“Do you feel disconnected from your own body?” (r = .549, p = .042; 2-tailed – see Figure 
2). This suggests that the more participants felt disconnected from their bodies on ketamine, 
the greater the intentional binding effect. There was no significant correlation between action 
binding and item 7 on the CADSS which asks “Does your sense of your own body feel 
changed: for instance, does your own body feel unusually large or unusually small?” (r = 
.208, p = .476; 2-tailed).  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Control analyses 
The CADSS questionnaire also measures changes in time perception. Given the temporal 
nature of our SoA measure we investigated the putative relation between binding and general 
changes in time perception. There were no significant correlations between action binding 
and time perception items on the scale (item 1 ‘Do things seem to be moving in slow 
motion?’: r = 198, p = .498; item 12 ‘Does this experience seem to take much longer than you 
would have expected?’: r = -.337, p = .238; item 13 ‘Do things seem to be happening very 
quickly, as if there is a lifetime in a moment?’: r = .265, p = .360). This suggests that changes 
in action binding were not related to general changes in the subjective experience of time.  
 
To determine the presence of possible drug order effects in our data we compared mean 
overall binding on ketamine vs. placebo, introducing ‘order’ (ketamine first vs. placebo first) 
as a between subjects variable. We found no significant main effect of ‘order’, F(1,12) = 
.381, p = .548, and no significant interaction, F(1,12) = .889, p = .364. This suggests that 
changes in binding were not linked to drug order.  
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We also compared standard deviations of time estimates across repeated trials. These provide 
a measure of perceptual timing variability, with higher standard deviations reflecting 
inconsistent timing performance. This may indicate difficulty in using the clock for timing 
judgements, erratic allocation of attention either to the action/ tone or to the clock, or general 
confusion. The increase in binding on ketamine was driven by differences in the binding of 
actions towards tones, so we focus on standard deviation of action time estimates. On 
ketamine the mean standard deviation was 77ms (SD 32) while on placebo it was 67ms (SD 
18). Despite the numerical increase, the difference in mean standard deviation was not 
significant, t(13) = 1.149, p = .271 (2-tailed). This suggests that changes in action binding 
were not related to general changes in timing ability.   
 
In a final control analysis we investigated whether there was a significant reduction in the 
speed of the self-paced response on ketamine, as it could be that changes in binding are 
related to changes in motor function. On ketamine the mean response latency was 3798ms 
(SD 1580) while on placebo it was 3538ms (SD 1160). Despite the numerical increase in 
response latency, this difference was not significant, t(13) = .945, p = .362 (2-tailed). This 
suggests that changes in action binding were not related to changes in motor function (as 
measured by the response latency).  
 
Discussion 
We investigated whether the psychotomimetic effects of ketamine extend to producing 
aberrant agency experiences associated with schizophrenia. On the intentional binding task 
under placebo conditions, the expected binding effect (a compression of the subjective 
interval between action and outcome; Haggard et al., 2002) was observed. Under ketamine 
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this effect was exaggerated, as has been previously reported in people with schizophrenia 
(Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010).  
 
The effect of ketamine on action-outcome binding is intriguing: the exaggerated effect was 
driven primarily by an increase in binding of actions towards the tone, rather than binding of 
tones back towards actions. Action binding represents the difference between action time 
estimates in the agency condition and action time estimates in the baseline condition.  
Previous studies have found that the experience of isolated action, as in the baseline 
condition, is anticipatory: on average, participants are aware of moving slightly before the 
actual onset of movement (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999). This 
suggests that motor experience in this context is not based on feedback generated by the 
actual movement itself. If it were, one would expect a slightly delayed awareness of moving 
owing to inherent delays in the transmission of sensory information to the brain (Obhi, 
Planetta, & Scantlebury, 2009). Instead, it has been proposed that the experience of isolated 
action is linked to processes occurring prior to movement onset (Haggard, 2003). In our data, 
the baseline experience of action on ketamine was significantly earlier than on placebo, while 
the baseline action awareness on placebo was, unusually, slightly delayed relative to the 
actual key press.  This pattern of results suggests that the drug may have exaggerated the 
putative influence of action preparation on the experience of action. 
 
However, whilst baseline action experience is generally anticipatory, the intentional binding 
effect in healthy adults shows that causing an external event through one’s own actions  (as in 
our agency condition) draws the temporal experience of action towards that event (Haggard 
et al., 2002; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore et al., 2009). It 
is this shift in action experience that represents the binding effect for actions, and it was 
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present on both placebo and ketamine. However, the magnitude of the shift was significantly 
greater on ketamine. It appears, therefore, that the presence of the tone exerted a particularly 
strong influence on action experience. In short, although ketamine has a strong effect on 
action experience when the action occurs without a perceptual consequence, we cannot 
interpret the drug’s effect merely in terms of this baseline action experience. Rather, the 
significantly greater subjective shift, on ketamine, in the experience of action towards the 
tone means that a full explanation of the effects of ketamine must take into account the 
experience of action in both the absence and the presence of the tone. 
 
Thus, bringing together the key results from the intentional binding task, ketamine appears to 
boost the influence of action preparation on action awareness, but also to boost the influence 
of the effects of action (a tone) on action awareness.  This combination may seem 
paradoxical.  However, several results suggest that the action experience is in fact a synthesis 
of a range of different events occurring over an extended time period between preparation 
and consequence  (Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, & Oakley, 2004; Haggard, 2005; Lau, 
Rogers, & Passingham, 2007;Moore & Haggard, 2008; Banks & Isham, 2009; Moore et al., 
2009). In normal circumstances action awareness is likely to be the result of integration of 
efferent and afferent processes in the sensorimotor system (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore 
et al., 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008).  On ketamine, however, the processes 
underlying this normal process of integration may be compromised.  
 
To this extent, our results are consistent with a ketamine-induced deficit in monitoring action 
signals. Participants appeared to feel dissociated from their own actions while on ketamine, 
since their representations of their own actions were susceptible to influences from other 
events, such as their original intentions and their subsequent effects.  Confirmation of this 
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dissociative interpretation comes from the correlations found between intentional binding and 
the specific CADSS item concerning the feeling of disconnection from the body. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that ketamine may preferentially influence a neural system 
for monitoring action.  As a result of this deficit, actions on ketamine become mutable and 
vulnerable to capture by other events. However, given the apparently tight coupling of SoO 
and SoA, the fact that increased SoA was associated with an increase in the feeling of 
disconnection from one’s body may be surprising. Dissociations between SoO and SoA are 
not uncommon in psychiatric illness such as schizophrenia. For example, a patient with 
passivity phenomena will recognise their actions as the movements of their own body 
(preserved SoO) but will experience their actions as produced by an external force (reduced 
SoA). However these dissociations cannot explain our finding that an increase in SoA was 
associated with reduced SoO on ketamine. The mutability hypothesis discussed above may 
provide an explanation: If ketamine engenders mutability in the experience of action, then the 
more one’s experience of action is ‘captured’ by external sensory events the greater the 
externalisation of bodily experience may be, resulting in the feeling of ‘disconnection’ from 
one’s own body.  
 
What might be the neurochemical and neuroanatomical basis of the hyperbinding effect we 
observed? One possibility is that hyperbinding is the product of aberrant prediction error 
signalling. Prediction error refers to the mismatch between expectation and occurrence, and is 
used as a teaching signal to drive causal associations between events (Dickinson, 2001). 
While midbrain dopamine neurons may signal a reward prediction error (Schultz & 
Dickinson, 2000) others have argued that their activity profile may reflect a novelty, salience 
or surprise signal used by organisms to judge whether or not they caused a surprising event to 
happen (Redgrave & Gurney, 2006).  We have previously shown that ketamine induces 
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prediction error responses to predictable events and thus increases the salience of those 
events (Corlett et al., 2006). Neurochemically, ketamine may increase dopamine and 
glutamate co-release, in the mesocortical pathway between the midbrain and prefrontal cortex  
(Corlett et al., 2006; Corlett et al., 2007). Such signalling has been suggested to register 
surprise and permit its explanation (Lavin et al., 2005). Since associations between intention, 
action and outcome are well learned, the ketamine induced hyperbinding effect we report 
presently may reflect inappropriate salience of action-outcome causal associations, via 
aberrant prediction error signalling. Our findings overall are compatible with the notion that 
the execution of action and SoA may be linked by a simple computational principle 
(minimizing prediction error) which, when perturbed, could explain the varied 
phenomenology of psychosis (Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). 
 
The hyperbinding found previously in schizophrenia patients (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et 
al., 2010), and here found also with ketamine, suggests an exaggerated SoA. A number of 
other studies, using different paradigms, have reported data which is consistent with this 
interpretation. For example, people with schizophrenia (including those experiencing 
passivity symptoms) are more likely than healthy controls to attribute the source of distorted 
or ambiguous visual feedback of an action to themselves (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 
2001; Fourneret et al., 2002; Schnell et al., 2008). This suggests a tendency towards over-
attribution of sensory consequences of movement to oneself (Synofzik et al., 2008). 
However, these data are at odds with the feeling of reduced SoA that is typically reported by 
patients. One solution to this paradox is offered by Franck et al. (2001), who have suggested 
that patients with passivity symptoms have a tendency towards self-attribution of extraneous 
events (see also Daprati et al., 1997). This could result in a feeling of being influenced when 
observing another action, and hyperassociation when observing action outcomes. In short, it 
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may be possible to recognise strongly the outcomes of one’s actions while at the same time 
feeling a diminished sense of agency for the actions themselves. This implies a distinction 
between feeling one is the author of action on the one hand, and feeling one is the author of 
an effect on the other. This putative distinction would be usefully explored in future studies.  
It should also be noted that exaggerated SoA may be associated with certain schizophrenia 
sub-types, particularly those with self-referential symptoms. For example, patients with 
persecutory delusions feel a greater sense of control over action outcomes compared with 
healthy and patient controls (Kaney & Bentall, 1992).  Therefore, the exaggerated agency 
effects shown in previous patient studies could be driven by the presence of patients with 
self-referential symptoms in these samples. Intriguingly, self-referential symptoms are also a 
common effect of the ketamine challenge (Corlett, Honey Fletcher, 2007; Honey et al., 2006). 
It may be, therefore, that the increased SoA found in the current study is associated with this 
specific effect of the drug.  
 
Whilst our study shows that ketamine can mimic aberrant agency experiences associated with 
schizophrenia, certain limitations of the task used should be noted. Unlike previous 
intentional binding studies (Haggard et al., 2002), we did not include any involuntary 
movement conditions. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation to induce involuntary 
movements, Haggard et al. (2002) showed that the binding of actions and outcomes was 
specific to voluntary, self-generated movement. In fact, when involuntary TMS-induced 
movements were followed by tones, they found a temporal repulsion between involuntary 
movement and tone. We did not include this TMS condition because the focus of our 
investigation was whether ketamine increased the magnitude of intentional binding for 
voluntary actions. It would be interesting in the future to explore the effect of the ketamine 
challenge on this ‘repulsion’ effect.  
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Limitations of the paradigm should also be noted. Intentional binding represents an implicit 
measure of agency experience. That is, participants are not required to make explicit agency 
judgements, such as the attribution of an observed movement to its correct origin (as in Farrer 
& Frith, 2002, for example). Implicit measures have certain advantages, such as the 
quantification of subjective experience, and the mitigation of demand effects. Also, such 
tasks may allow us to detect subtle perceptual and cognitive changes engendered by the drug 
and relate them to the early stages of psychosis. However, there are certain drawbacks. 
Primarily, implicit measures will fail to capture the broader phenomenology of SoA, in 
particular the highly complex phenomenology associated with delusions of agency in 
established psychosis. In the current study this limitation was mitigated somewhat by the 
observation that changes in these subtle implicit measures correlate with participants’ self 
reports of drug-induced changes in body experience. 
 
Finally, limitations of the ketamine model of schizophrenia should also be acknowledged. For 
example, whilst ketamine produces a range of symptoms associated with endogenous 
psychosis (arguably a broader range than other drug models of the disease; Krystal et al., 
1994) there are notable exceptions (Fletcher & Honey, 2006). Furthermore, ketamine 
produces changes that are not necessarily associated with schizophrenia, such as euphoria 
(Fletcher & Honey, 2006). Although it is important to acknowledge limitations of the drug 
model, we do not feel they undermine our interpretation of the present data, given the fact 
that these data are consistent with schizophrenic psychopathology and replicate previous 
behavioural data from patients with the disease (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010).   
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Despite these caveats, this study shows that the psychotomimetic property of ketamine may 
extend to aberrant experiences of agency associated with schizophrenia. In particular, 
ketamine mimics the exaggerated intentional binding effect that has been found in association 
with the disease.  The pattern of results suggested a mutable experience of action on 
ketamine, consistent with a deficit in the neural circuits for action monitoring.  We believe 
that these findings may be explained in terms of changes in stimulus salience via aberrant 
prediction error signalling. Ketamine may be a valuable psychopharmacological model of 
aberrant agency experiences found in schizophrenia. To this extent, it could be used to 
elucidate the neurobiological and psychological basis of such aberrant experiences. 
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Figure headings 
Figure 1 Trial structure in the agency condition (following Haggard et al., 2002). Participants pressed the key at 
a time of their choosing which produced a tone after a delay of 250ms. Participants judged where the clock hand 
was when they pressed the key or when they heard the tone, in separate blocks of trials  
 
Figure 2 Scatter plot showing the significant correlation between Action binding and CADSS Item 6 (“Do you 
feel disconnected from your own body?”) on ketamine (100ng/mL) 
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Tables 
Table 1 Mean judgment errors in ms (SD across subjects) and shifts relative to baseline conditions in ms  
 Judged Event Mean  (SD) judgement 
error  (ms) 
Mean shift from 
baseline  (ms)  (SD) 
Overall binding 
measure  (ms)  (SD) 
Baseline conditions     
Placebo Action 4  (42)   
 Tone -14  (55)  
 
 
Ketamine Action -24  (52)   
 Tone -8  (46)   
Agency conditions     
Placebo Action 26  (55) 22  (36)  
 Tone -37  (61) -23  (51) 
 
45  (69) 
Ketamine Action 28  (63) 52  (38)  
 Tone -28  (71) -20  (59) 72  (70) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
